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ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND THE 
SELECTION OF DISPUTES FOR LITIGATION 
KEITH N. HYLTON* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
WHAT explains the decision to litigate rather than settle a dispute? The 
standard theoretical approach to this question is a contract model that 
suggests that parties will litigate when the set of mutually beneficial settle- 
ment agreements-that is, the contract zone-is empty.' The contract 
zone may be empty because the parties have divergent expectations of 
the trial outcome or because one party has more at stake than the other.2 
The divergent-expectations explanation suggests that there are general 
respects in which litigated disputes differ from settled disputes and that 
one need not know the identities of litigants or the specific area of litiga- 
tion in order to understand the differences between litigated and settled 
disputes. The differential-stakes explanation implies that such informa- 
tion is necessary.3 
The divergent-expectations theory of selection was developed in large 
* Northwestern University School of Law. This article has benefited from comments 
made by participants at the Summer 1991 Law and Society Meetings, Amsterdam, and from 
suggestions by Ron Allen, John Donohue, Eric Rasmusen, Peter Siegelman, and David Van 
Zandt. 
1 The standard model was developed in William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of 
the Courts, 14 J. Law & Econ. 61 (1971); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 
2 J. Legal Stud. 279 (1973); and Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal 
Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. Legal Stud. 399 (1973). 
2 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 524-25 (3d ed. 1986). 
3 For example, in order to use the differential-stakes theory to explain litigation patterns, 
one will need to know whether the litigants are "repeat players" or "one-shot" litigants. 
For discussion of these types of litigant and the differential-stakes theory generally, see 
Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal 
Change, 9 L. & Soc. Rev. 95 (1974). 
[Journal of Legal Studies, vol. XXII (January 1993)] 
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part by George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein.4 It predicts that plaintiffs 
should win roughly 50 percent of their cases because the ones that are 
litigated are those in which the outcome is most uncertain. In this set of 
cases, the frequency with which plaintiffs win should be the same as the 
frequency with which an unbiased coin will land "heads." Win rates that 
diverge from this 50 percent prediction can be explained by differential 
stakes or by other factors specific to the litigants or the area of litigation. 
The evidence in favor of the 50 percent plaintiff win rate prediction is 
subject to debate.5 Priest and Klein found evidence that supports it. Wil- 
liam Baxter, who looked at antitrust cases, and Theodore Eisenberg, 
who examined federal court cases, rejected the 50 percent hypothesis.6 
Although the evidence is inconclusive, no alternative theory has been 
proposed that suggests that win rates should, in general, be greater or 
less than 50 percent. 
This article presents a theory of the selection of disputes for litigation 
that, like the Priest-Klein analysis, does not require information on the 
identities of litigants. I show that win-rate patterns can be explained by 
the informational requirements of the relevant legal standard. In areas 
where the law requires information on the defendant's level of compli- 
ance with a legal standard and where defendants have more information 
on this than plaintiffs do, win rates will be low (that is, below 50 percent). 
If neither party has an informational advantage (the Priest-Klein model), 
a 50 percent win rate should be observed. Alternatively, if the legal test 
does not require information on the defendant's level of compliance or if 
the plaintiff has the informational advantage, a high win rate may be 
observed. 
These results can be explained intuitively. Suppose that the legal test 
concerns the defendant's level of compliance with a legal standard and 
that the defendant has more information on her level of compliance than 
4 George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
Legal Stud. 1 (1984); George L. Priest, Measuring Legal Change, 3 J. L. Econ. & Org. 193 
(1987). An earlier discussion that anticipates the core of the Priest-Klein hypothesis can be 
found in William Baxter, The Political Economy of Antitrust: Principal Paper by William 
Baxter (Robert D. Tollison ed. 1980). For extensions of the selection model, see Donald 
Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased? 14 J. Legal Stud. 185 (1985); Donald 
Wittman, Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A Study of 
the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data, 17 J. Legal Stud. 313 (1988). 
5The plaintiff win rate is the number of disputes won by plaintiffs divided by the number 
of disputes. Hereafter, I will use "win rate" instead of "plaintiff win rate." 
6 William Baxter, supra note 4, at 23; and Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection 
Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests, 19 J. Legal Stud. 337 (1990). 
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does the plaintiff.7 As a result, the defendant has a sharper estimate than 
does the plaintiff of the likely outcome of a trial. 
It follows that the guilty defendant will be relatively pessimistic (com- 
pared to the plaintiff) and the innocent defendant will be relatively opti- 
mistic about the outcome of a trial.8 Assuming settlement is cheaper than 
litigation, disputes in which the contract zone is empty will involve only 
innocent defendants. Thus, guilty defendants will be more likely to settle 
than innocent defendants. Litigated cases will tend to oversample from 
the pool of innocent defendants. Thus, the selection effect predicts a 
tendency for litigation (where defendants have the informational advan- 
tage) to involve innocent defendants. 
Another issue raised by this article is why litigation ever occurs. I 
argue that strategic behavior is a necessary condition for litigation. The 
reason is simple. Consider (again) the case in which the defendant has 
the informational advantage. If parties did not behave strategically, then 
the defendant's refusal to accept a settlement demand that falls within 
the contract zone for a guilty defendant would reveal her innocence. The 
parties would then settle on terms that reflect the defendant's true status. 
Thus, strategic behavior is central to any attempt to explain patterns of 
litigation.9 
If parties behave strategically, it is unlikely that, in equilibrium, inno- 
cent defendants would reveal themselves by being the only ones to reject 
settlement demands within a certain range. In any such equilibrium, 
guilty defendants would have an incentive to reject similar settlement 
7 In the model presented in Priest and Klein, supra note 4, which is the most rigorous 
presentation of the standard model, neither party has an advantage in predicting the out- 
come of trial. Although Priest and Klein do not address this issue explicitly, the assumption 
underlying their model seems to be that the defendant does not have an informational 
advantage. Alternatively, the Priest-Klein model assumes any informational advantage pos- 
sessed by the defendant cannot be used to make a more accurate prediction of the trial 
outcome. 
The assumption that the defendant has an informational advantage is made in Lucian 
Ayre Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 15 Rand J. Econ. 
404 (1984); Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation, 18 Rand J. Econ. 198 (1987); 
I. P. L. Png, Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 Bell J. Econ. 539 (1983); 
and I. P. L. Png, Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care, 34 J. Public Econ. 61 (1987). 
Although these articles have implications for the selection literature, they do not offer 
predictions concerning the win rate of plaintiffs in trials. 
8 For simplicity, the defendant who has violated the legal standard will be referred to as 
"guilty," and the defendant who has not violated the legal standard will be referred to 
as "innocent." 
9 See Robert Cooter & Stephen Marks, with Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the Shadow 
of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. Legal Stud. 225 (1982). 
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demands in order to appear innocent. It follows that the pool of defen- 
dants who reject settlement demands will include innocent and guilty 
defendants but that the innocent most likely will outnumber the guilty. 
In sum, two propositions predict that litigation in which the defendant 
has the informational advantage will oversample innocent defendants. 
First, disputes in which the contract zone is empty will involve only 
innocent defendants. Second, the likely equilibrium of the settlement- 
negotiation process will be one in which the true status of defendants is 
not revealed. Given the predicted oversampling of innocent defendants 
in the pool of defendants who litigate, the win rate of plaintiffs should 
tend toward the probability of an erroneous verdict for the plaintiff (type 
II error). In this set of disputes, therefore, one should expect to find low 
win rates. 
I also present a brief discussion of some of the evidence on win rates. 
I find that the predicted low win rates where defendants have the informa- 
tional advantage is consistent with Eisenberg's data from federal court 
cases and with studies reporting the behavior of win rates over time in 
product-liability, antitrust, and employment-discrimination cases.'1 
Two additional implications of the model are discussed. One is that, in 
areas where the defendant has the informational advantage, attorneys' 
estimates of the likelihood of the plaintiff winning-which, on average, 
will be accurate if they make rational forecasts-will be greater than 
objective measures of the win rate. This may explain the simultaneous 
occurrence of low win rates in malpractice and product liability and re- 
ports of widespread fear of being sued in these areas. The second implica- 
tion concerns doctrinal change. The selection model probably provides a 
better explanation of some perceived doctrinal shifts than a model that 
attributes change to the efforts of judges. 
This article is organized as follows. Section II presents the model, 
which extends the standard litigation model by taking into account infor- 
mational constraints and efforts to rationally predict trial outcomes. I 
develop conditions under which litigation (where defendants have the 
informational advantage) tends to oversample innocent defendants. Sec- 
tion III discusses the evidence supporting the selection model presented. 
Section IV discusses additional implications of the model. 
10 On product liability, see James A. Henderson, Jr., & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet 
Revolution in Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 
479 (1990); on antitrust, see Steven C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Private Antitrust Litiga- 
tion: An Introduction and Framework, in Private Antitrust Litigation (Lawrence J. White 
ed. 1988); on employment discrimination, see Peter Siegelman, The Influence of Macroeco- 
nomic Conditions on Plaintiff Win Rates in Unpublished Federal Employment Discrimina- 
tion Cases (American Bar Foundation, Working Paper No. 9012, 1990). 
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II. THEORY 
A. Standard Litigation Model 
In the standard model of litigation,"l the plaintiff's minimum settlement 
demand is equal to 
PpJ- Cp, (1) 
where Pp is the plaintiff's estimate of the probability of a verdict in his 
favor, Cp is the plaintiff's expected cost of litigating, and J is the size 
of the damage award if the plaintiff wins.'2 The defendant's maximum 
settlement offer is 
PdJ + Cd, (2) 
where Pd is the defendant's estimate of the probability of a verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff. It is assumed that Cd, Cp, and J are fixed amounts 
that are known by both sides. Since J is given, the stakes for the sides 
are the same.13 
A sufficient condition for litigation to occur is 
(P - Pd)J > Cp + Cd. (3) 
Condition (3) implies that no mutually advantageous settlement can be 
arranged between the defendant and the plaintiff because their beliefs 
differ too much relative to the costs of litigation. If parties always settle 
whenever settlement is mutually advantageous, then condition (3) is also 
a necessary condition for litigation. 
An additional requirement is that the plaintiff's threat to litigate must 
be credible.14 If the plaintiff's threat to litigate were not credible, the 
defendant would not have an incentive to make a positive settlement offer 
in response to the plaintiff's settlement demand. The plaintiff's threat to 
" See the articles cited in note 1 supra. 
12 I have assumed that the cost of settling the suit is zero. 
13 One can easily incorporate disputes in which one party has more at stake than the 
judgment. An example would be a defamation suit in which part of the plaintiff's gain from 
bringing suit is the value of being seen defending his reputation. 
14 See, for example, Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased? supra note 4, 
at 186-87; Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alter- 
native Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. Legal Stud. 55 (1982). This require- 
ment can be viewed as an application of the perfectness notion in game theory; see, for 
example, Shavell at 74. See Nalebuff, supra note 7, for explicit consideration of this in a 
formal model of the litigation process. 
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litigate is credible if 
PpJ - Cp > 0. (4) 
B. Information and Error 
Consider a dispute where the victim (plaintiff) has suffered an injury 
at the hands of the injurer (defendant). Assume information is asymmetric 
because the defendant knows whether she violated the relevant legal 
standard while the plaintiff does not. Let W denote the plaintiff's rational- 
expectations estimate of the probability that the defendant violated the 
legal standard, given an injury suffered at the hands of the defendant. 
The plaintiff bases his estimate of W on observations that are correlated 
with the defendant's level of compliance with the legal standard and on 
information concerning the probability distributions of characteristics a 
court would use in evaluating compliance. 
Let Q1 be the probability that a defendant who has violated the legal 
standard will be found not liable (alternatively, the probability of type I 
error). Let Q2 be the probability that a defendant who has not violated 
the legal standard will be found liable (the probability of type II error). I 
assume that15 
1 - - Q2> 0 (5) 
No attempt is made to distinguish between the plaintiff's and the defen- 
dant's estimates of the error probabilities. To simplify, I assume that 
both estimates are the same and equal to the corresponding objective 
frequencies because they are based on public information.16 
The plaintiff's estimate of the probability of a favorable verdict is 
p = W(1 - Q) + (1 - W)Q2. (6) 
15 This assumption on error probabilities is made in A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven 
Shavell, Legal Error, Litigation, and the Incentive to Obey the Law, 5 J. L. Econ. & Org. 
99, 101 (1989). The condition embodies two assumptions: (1) that the probability that a guilty 
defendant will be found innocent is less than the probability that an innocent defendant will 
be found innocent, and (2) that the probability that an innocent defendant will be found 
guilty is less than the probability that a guilty defendant will be found guilty. The assump- 
tions are reasonable accuracy requirements. 
16 For example, if the estimates of error probabilities are based on information concerning 
the predispositions of judges, it is assumed that this information is known to both parties. 
This assumption could be relaxed by allowing one party to have more information about 
the judge's "leanings" than the other. For discussion of the influence of information on 
judges' predispositions on litigation, see George L. Priest, Selective Characteristics of Liti- 
gation, 9 J. Legal Stud. 399, 408 (1980). 
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Under the assumption that she knows whether or not she violated the 
legal standard, the defendant's estimate of the probability of a favorable 
verdict for the plaintiff is 
Pd = 1 - Ql (7a) 
if the defendant violated the legal standard and 
Pd = Q2 (7b) 
if the defendant did not violate the legal standard. 
PROPOSITION 1. If the defendant violated the legal standard, then her 
estimate of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff will be greater 
than or equal to the plaintiff's. If the defendant did not violate the legal 
standard, then her estimate of the probability of a verdict for the plaintiff 
will be less than or equal to the plaintiff's. 
The intuition supporting proposition 1 is straightforward. If the court 
meets the accuracy requirement in condition (5), defendants who have 
violated the legal standard will have a higher estimate of the probability 
of a verdict for the plaintiff than will the plaintiff. Similarly, defendants 
who have not violated the standard will have a lower estimate.17 The 
reason for this result is that the plaintiff forms his prediction of the proba- 
bility of a favorable verdict by averaging over two populations of poten- 
tial injurers: those who would have violated the standard (discounting the 
estimate by the probability that type I error does not occur) and those 
who would not have violated the standard (discounting the latter estimate 
by the probability of type II error). The plaintiff's rational-expectations 
estimate of a verdict in his favor therefore is less than the probability 
that type I error does not occur (the estimate used by a guilty defendant) 
and greater than the probability that type II error does occur (the estimate 
used by an innocent defendant). 
C. Litigation and Settlement 
An immediate implication of proposition 1 and the sufficient condition 
for litigation (see [3]) is as follows. 
PROPOSITION 2. The sufficient condition for litigation is never satisfied 
in a dispute involving a guilty defendant. 
Proof. Proposition 1 implies that (3) cannot hold if the defendant is 
guilty. 
17 Since 1 - Q < Q2, it follows that, for guilty defendants, 1 - Ql > Pp unless W = 1, 
and, for innocent defendants, Q2 < Pp unless W = 0. 
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Proposition 2 implies that if all litigation were determined by the nonex- 
istence of a mutually beneficial settlement agreement, then every instance 
of litigation would involve a defendant who is innocent of violating the 
legal standard. Thus, the win rate of plaintiffs would be equal to the rate 
of erroneous verdicts for the plaintiff. 
The difficulty with this conclusion is that it ignores the information 
conveyed by the settlement process. We know that the parties will always 
choose to settle rather than litigate if the settlement payment is below 
the defendant's maximum offer and above the plaintiff's minimum de- 
mand. If only innocent defendants chose litigation over settlement, then 
the defendant's refusal to accept a settlement demand that falls within 
the contract zone for a guilty defendant would reveal her innocence. A 
rational plaintiff therefore would revise his estimate of the probability of 
a verdict in his favor, so that it reflects the belief that the defendant is 
innocent. Since their estimates of the trial outcome then would be the 
same, the parties would settle to avoid the cost of litigation.'8 In short, 
if parties did not behave strategically, there would be no litigation. The 
disputes involving guilty defendants would be settled because the parties' 
estimates of the trial outcome-based on information available before 
settlement negotiations-would permit settlement agreements to occur 
(that is, the contract zone would not be empty). The disputes involving 
innocent defendants would be settled because their refusal to accept ini- 
tial settlement demands would reveal their innocence. 
Now introduce strategic behavior. Suppose the plaintiff starts with an 
initial demand D1 that is in the contract zone only for a guilty defendant.'9 
If the defendant is innocent, she will reject this demand. Surprisingly, if 
the defendant is guilty, she may also have an incentive to reject the 
demand in order to fool the plaintiff into thinking her innocent.20 Indeed, 
any outcome in which only innocent defendants reject settlement de- 
mands that fall within a guilty defendant's contract zone could not be an 
equilibrium because guilty defendants would also reject such demands. 
Given the strategic behavior of guilty defendants, the plaintiff may not 
reduce his settlement demand to a level within an innocent defendant's 
contract zone.21 To see this, suppose the frequency with which the defen- 
18 The parties would settle (for some positive amount) if plaintiff's threat to litigate 
remained credible, that is, if Q2J - Cp > 0. If his threat were not credible, then the plaintiff 
would drop his claim (equivalently, settle for zero dollars). 
19 Specifically, Dl is greater than [W(l - Ql) + (1 - W)Q2]J - Cp and less than (1 - 
Q )J + Cd. 
20 See Png, Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care, supra note 7. 
21 A demand within an innocent defendant's contract zone would be one that is less than 
Q2J + Cd. 
194 
ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND LITIGATION 
dant rejects the ith settlement demand, given that she is guilty, is Si. 
Equilibrium requires Si > 0 for each period of the negotiation process 
(save the last). The probability that the innocent defendant will reject the 
initial demand is one. Using Bayes's rule, the probability that a defendant 
is guilty, given rejection of the initial demand, is S W/[S W + (1 - W)]. 
The plaintiff's initial estimate of the probability of a negligence verdict 
is W(1 - Q1) + (1 - W)Q2, and his revised estimate is 
{S, WI[S1 W + (1 - W)]}(1 - Q1) + {1 - S, W/[S1 W + (1 - W)]}Q2. (8) 
Because S, > 0, the revised estimate will be greater than Q2, and the 
revised minimum demand will exceed the demand that would be offered 
to a defendant who is known to be innocent. 
The possibility of strategic behavior suggests that litigation may occur 
because an equilibrium will not exist in which only innocent defendants 
reject settlement demands (alternatively, mixed strategies are necessary). 
The proportion of guilty defendants who reject settlement demands may 
be too high for plaintiffs to rationally offer settlement demands within 
an innocent defendant's contract zone. In response to rejections, some 
plaintiffs will bring suit.22 
Among the defendants who reject settlement demands, the proportion 
of innocent defendants is SiWI[SiW + (1 - W)], and the proportion of 
guilty defendants is (1 - W)/[SiW + (1 - W)]. It follows that among 
rejecters of settlement demands, the innocent will outnumber the guilty 
if 
SiW< - W, (9) 
which is likely to hold generally.23 An additional reason for predicting 
that (9) will hold is that rejection is a signaling device, likely to be used 
22 See Png, Litigation, Liability, and Incentives for Care, supra note 7. Although Png's 
model offers a rigorous justification for the basic claim of this section, its assumptions are 
restrictive. His model assumes that settlement is a two-period game in which the defendant 
first makes an offer and the plaintiff responds by accepting or bringing suit. An alternative 
model is one in which the defendant makes the last move by deciding whether to accept or 
reject a settlement demand. In this alternative model, it is more difficult to make sense of 
litigation, especially litigation involving guilty defendants. The reason is that, at the end 
period of the game, each defendant would accept any settlement offer within the contract 
zone. It follows then that only two types of equilibria could result: a pooling equilibrium in 
which all parties settle and a separating equilibrium in which only innocent parties litigate. 
Litigation against guilty defendants could be explained in two ways. One is that some 
plaintiffs will break off settlement negotiations and bring suit before the end period arrives. 
The other is that the end period is not really an end period, given the likelihood of an 
appeal. 
23 Note that (9) holds unambiguously for any W < 1/2. 
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strategically when it is a strong signal of innocence, which is consistent 
with (9).24 
The Influence of Uncertainty. A central proposition of the Priest- 
Klein model of selection is that disputes in which the evidence points 
strongly toward either innocence or guilt are more likely to settle than 
those in which it does not. The proposition holds in the model presented 
here. 
Consider a dispute in which the information available to the plaintiff 
suggests that the defendant was far from compliance with the legal stan- 
dard. In this case, W will be close to one, and Q1 and Q2 close to zero. 
Under these assumptions, rejection of a settlement demand at best will 
send a weak signal of innocence to the plaintiff. The plaintiff would not 
have an incentive to make a substantial reduction in his initial settlement 
demand because, he would reason, very few innocent injurers would 
find themselves in the defendant's position.25 Since the likely gain from 
rejecting a demand within the contract zone is very small, a guilty defen- 
dant will seldom have an incentive to use rejection strategically. 
Consider a dispute in which the information available to the plaintiff 
suggests that the defendant did not violate the legal standard. Under this 
assumption, the plaintiff's threat to sue will not generally be credible, so 
that neither litigation nor settlement will occur. If the plaintiff's threat to 
sue is credible, settlement is likely. Since very few of the injurers will be 
guilty, rejection will be a strong signal of innocence, which implies that 
the plaintiff should be willing to reduce his demand to a level acceptable 
to the defendant. 
The Influence of Legal Error. Instead of a reduction in uncertainty, 
consider a reduction in the likelihood of legal error. In other words, the 
evidence specific to each dispute is no clearer, but the court is less likely 
to decide incorrectly (that is, Q1 and Q2 approach zero). A reduction in 
the likelihood of error increases the distance between the expected liabil- 
ity of an innocent defendant, Q2J + Cd, and the expected liability of a 
guilty defendant, (1 - Q )J + Cd. This increases the zone of acceptable 
settlement demands for guilty defendants and increases the zone of unac- 
ceptable settlement demands for innocent defendants. The likely result 
is an increase in the proportion of innocent defendants who litigate. 
24 Note that there would be no incentive for a guilty defendant to use rejection strategi- 
cally when S, = 1. 
25 A more precise explanation follows. The plaintiff's downward revision of Pp after 
rejection of the initial settlement demand will be significant only if S1W/[S1W + (1 - W)] 
< W. Moreover, the greater the difference between SIW/[S1W + (1 - W)] and W, the 
greater will be the plaintiff's downward revision of Pp. If W is very close to one, however, 
the difference between SIW/[S1W + (1 - W)] and W will be very small, whatever the value 
of S1. 
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D. The Selection Effect and the Win Rate 
Let n2 represent the number of innocent defendants who litigate, and 
let n1 represent the number of guilty defendants who litigate. Both the 
Priest-Klein model and my model suggest that litigants will be drawn 
largely from disputes in which the evidence does not strongly suggest 
whether or not the defendant has complied with the relevant legal stan- 
dard. Let Q m and Q2m represent the mean error rates for this set of 
disputes. The win rate of plaintiffs can be approximated by 
V = [nl(l - Qlm) + n2Q2]/N, (10) 
where N is equal to the sum of n1 and n2. 
This model suggests that innocent defendants should be the largest 
category of defendants who litigate. If the selection effect operates as 
anticipated by this model, the win rate (see [10]) will be less than the 
average plaintiff's initial estimate of the probability of a verdict in his 
favor.26 
Is it possible to predict whether the win rate will be less than or greater 
than 50 percent, or whether it will fall over time? In general, the answer 
seems to be no. The formula for the plaintiffs' win rate (eq. [10]) can take 
any value between 1 - Q1m and Q2m. Plausible conditions under which 
the win rate will be below 50 percent, however, can be stated. It follows 
from (10) that, if Qlm is roughly equal to Q2m and if both Qlm and Q2m 
are less than 1/2,27 then the selection effect implies that the win rate will 
be less than 50 percent. 
The behavior of the win rate over time can also be established. Imagine 
the existence of some technology that reduces the likelihood of judicial 
error, and suppose that it reduces the frequencies of type I and type 
II error at equal rates. The obvious candidate for this error-reducing 
technology is the stock of legal doctrine.28 Letting Z represent the stock 
26 This follows from (6). The average plaintiff's estimate of the probability of a favorable 
verdict is found by averaging Pp over all plaintiffs (at each point along the evidence spec- 
trum). But the selection process described in Sec. IIC implies that, at each point along the 
evidence spectrum, W (the ratio of violators to injurers) is greater than the ratio of guilty 
defendants to defendants because a disproportionate share of the guilty injurers settle. 
27 There seems to be no reliable data on error rates. Tullock, however, argues that a 
rough estimate of the "probability of error" is 1/8. See Gordon Tullock, Trials on Trial: 
The Pure Theory of Legal Procedure 31-33 (1980). 
28 The error rates in this model may be interpreted as measuring or reflecting the fre- 
quency of inconsistent decisions that should fall as the doctrine is elaborated. Of course, 
whether growth in legal doctrine caused by litigation clarifies the doctrine is a subject of 
debate. Out of disdain for what he perceived as inescapable ambiguity in the common law, 
Jeremy Bentham devoted considerable effort to lobbying in favor of a civil code that could 
replace it. See H. L. A. Hart, Essays on Bentham 73, 76-78 (1982). Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
The Common Law 111-29 (1881), argued that legal standards become clearer over time. 
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of legal doctrine, I assume that dQ mldZ = dQ2m,dZ < 0. Suppose further 
that Q,m and Q2m are roughly equal, and let the common value be Q. The 
effect of a small increase in Z on the win rate of plaintiffs therefore is 
dVpldZ = [1 - 2(nl/N)]dQldZ + [d(n1lN)ldZ](1 - 2Q). (11) 
The first term in (11) is negative because n/lN < 1/2. The second term 
also is likely to be negative because the proportion of innocent defendants 
will probably increase as error rates fall (that is, n1/N will fall as Z in- 
creases), and Q will generally be less than 1/2. Thus, the win rate of 
plaintiffs falls with a reduction in error if the selection effect operates as 
predicted by this model. 
The falling-win-rate prediction can be explained intuitively: the down- 
ward trend results from a reduction in the error rate and from a change 
in the mix of cases coming to trial. The win rate falls as the error rate falls 
because the number of erroneous verdicts against innocent defendants 
declines. Since the selection effect implies that innocents will make up 
the majority of defendants, the net effect of a reduction in error is a 
reduction in the win rate. The mix of cases coming to trial reduces the 
win rate because, as error rates fall, the proportion of cases involving 
innocent defendants will increase. The reason for this is that, other things 
being equal, a reduction in error will increase the zone of acceptable 
settlement demands for guilty defendants and the zone of unacceptable 
settlement demands for innocent defendants. 
Two hypotheses emerge. First, assuming that error rates are relatively 
small, an observation of a win rate less than 50 percent is evidence that 
the selection effect operates as anticipated. Second, a win rate that falls 
over time can be taken as weak evidence that the selection effect operates 
as anticipated. A related, though weaker hypothesis is that the rate at 
which disputes are litigated should fall over time.29 
The reason error rates fall over time is that, as doctrine develops, fewer issues relevant to 
the compliance question are left entirely to the jury. In the limit, the question of compliance 
itself is decided by the judge according to rules that have been developed in earlier cases. 
For an argument that is broadly similar but focuses on incentives to litigate, see William 
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 
19 J. Law & Econ. 249 (1976). 
29 This is a weaker hypothesis because it is also consistent with the Priest-Klein theory. 
The Priest-Klein model, however, does not imply that the plaintiff win rate, in most cases, 
will fall over time; indeed, such an observation would be inconsistent with the Priest-Klein 
theory. 
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III. EVIDENCE 
A. Predictions 
The model discussed in Section IIB is one in which the defendant 
has the informational advantage. If the plaintiff has the informational 
advantage, its implications are reversed. Thus, the general implications 
of this article's theory for the pattern of win rates can be summarized as 
follows. (a) In areas in which the legal test requires an examination of 
the defendant's compliance with a legal standard and defendants have 
the informational advantage, low win rates should be observed. (b) In 
areas in which the legal test requires an examination of the defendant's 
compliance with a legal standard and plaintiffs have the informational 
advantage, high win rates should be observed. (c) In areas in which the 
legal test requires an examination of the defendant's level of compliance 
and neither party has an informational advantage (the Priest-Klein 
model), win rates of 50 percent (the Priest-Klein prediction) should be 
observed. 
Some additional implications follow. In areas of litigation in which the 
defendant has the informational advantage, one should observe win rates 
that fall over time. Since the error rate falls over time, fewer verdicts 
against innocent defendants (who make up the majority of defendants) 
will occur, and the proportion of innocent defendants who litigate will 
increase. Where the plaintiff has the informational advantage one should 
observe rising win rates over time because, as the error rate falls, fewer 
guilty defendants (who make up the majority) are found innocent and the 
proportion of guilty defendants who litigate will increase. Where neither 
party has the informational advantage, a stable 50 percent win rate should 
be observed. 
Informational distinctions often can be drawn for different categories 
of litigation. One distinction is between contract and tort litigation. On 
one hand, the informational-advantage question is likely to be less clear 
in the contract area because contract disputes involve issues that may 
give either party an informational advantage. Whether there was an inten- 
tion to offer or to accept, the rules governing contract interpretation, and 
the doctrines of mistake, reliance, and consideration all require some 
examination of information that the plaintiff is likely to possess. On the 
other hand, some tort disputes involve only the defendant's level of com- 
pliance. In these disputes, defendants will most likely have the informa- 
tional advantage. Within the set of tort disputes, further distinctions can 
be made. Disputes involving issues of contributory or comparative negli- 
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gence are not likely to be ones in which either party has an informational 
advantage. Thus, the prediction of low win rates should be observed in 
tort disputes in which compliance on the part of the defendant is the 
principal issue. 
B. Data 
Tables Al, A2, and A3 of the Appendix present the win-rate data of 
the Eisenberg, Daniels and Martin, and Priest and Klein studies.30 The 
data are consistent with the predictions of this article's model. Eisen- 
berg's data show that win rates are generally higher in contract disputes 
than in tort disputes (Table Al). The same pattern is observed comparing 
win rates in tort and intellectual-property cases, which are likely to be 
similar to contract disputes in the scope of their informational demands. 
Win rates within tort disputes also are in line with the model's predic- 
tions. In Tables Al and A2, the tort disputes with win rates consistently 
lower than 50 percent are areas in which only the defendant's compliance 
matters-malpractice and product-liability litigation.31 Eisenberg's data 
seem to support the general claim that the substantial areas of litigation 
in which the defendant is likely to possess an informational advantage are 
those in which win rates are low. Antitrust, malpractice, product-liability, 
employment-discrimination (jobs in Table Al), and civil-rights32 cases fall 
in this category.33 
30 Eisenberg, supra note 6; Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Jury Verdicts and the 
"Crisis" in Civil Justice, 11 Just. Sys. J. 321 (1986); and Priest & Klein, supra note 4. 
31 Table A2 may reveal another distinction among the tort disputes: win rates are lower 
in negligence/contributory-negligence jurisdictions. The relatively low plaintiff win rates in 
the "vehicular accidents" column for the Missouri counties may reflect the fact that, over 
most of the period covered, these counties had a contributory-negligence system while most 
other jurisdictions in the sample had comparative-negligence systems. See Daniels & Mar- 
tin, supra note 30, at 331-32. One could argue that, because the informational requirements 
of comparative negligence are greater (degrees of negligence must be assessed under com- 
parative negligence, while any significant negligence on the part of the plaintiff bars recovery 
under contributory negligence), the data are entirely consistent with the theory presented 
in this article. This is not clearly supported by Table A2, however, because the data measure 
gross instead of net awards. It is possible that the difference between measured win rates 
under comparative and contributory negligence in large part reflects the method of measur- 
ing awards. 
32 The "civil-rights" cases in the Eisenberg data set include Fifth Amendment claims, 
actions brought under civil rights statutes (42 U.S.C. ?? 1981, 1983, 1985, 1988), and discrim- 
ination claims involving federally assisted programs (42 U.S.C. ? 2000). See Theodore 
Eisenberg, Litigation Models and Trial Outcomes in Civil Rights and Prisoner Cases, 77 
Geo. L. J. 1567, 1574 (1989). 
33 The low win rate reported in Table Al for antitrust cases is a consistent finding (indeed, 
the figure in Table Al is higher than the level reported in most studies). Baxter, supra note 
4, at 17, reported win rates ranging from 4.9 percent in 1964 to 22.6 percent in 1970 (the 
seven-year average was 15.2 percent). See also Salop & White, supra note 10, at 40-42. 
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The Priest-Klein selection model implies that win rates should be 50 
percent generally, and that deviations from 50 percent can be explained 
by differential stakes. The data ("disaggregated" into subfields of litiga- 
tion) reported in the Eisenberg and the Daniels and Martin studies seem 
to be inconsistent with this hypothesis, unless one believes that the vast 
majority of areas of litigation involve parties who have different stakes.34 
The theory presented here is consistent with the disaggregated pattern of 
win rates and has the advantage of not being reducible to the claim that 
each win rate can be explained only by litigant-specific factors. The low 
win rates observed in antitrust, malpractice, and civil-rights litigation are 
not exceptional cases that need to be explained by litigant-specific theo- 
ries; these are areas in which this article's hypothesized selection effect 
receives its strongest support. 
There are other empirical problems with the differential-stakes theory. 
First, although it may provide a reasonable explanation of low win rates 
in malpractice and product-liability litigation, it does not explain satisfac- 
torily the low win rate in employment-discrimination cases. A doctor who 
is a defendant in a malpractice dispute may have more at stake than the 
plaintiff because an adverse judgment reflects on the quality of her ser- 
vice. A manufacturer shares a similar concern about her product but also 
the concern that an adverse judgment will lead to additional suits. Neither 
of these explanations seems to fit in the employment-discrimination cat- 
egory.35 
The second problem for the differential-stakes hypothesis is, if it ex- 
plains the low win rate in product-liability tort suits, what explains the 
high win rate in product-liability contract disputes (Table Al)? The differ- 
ential stakes theory predicts low win rates in both product-liability tort 
and contract disputes. To be sure, if product-liability contract disputes 
largely involve breaches of an express warranty, there may be less con- 
cern that an adverse judgment will lead to a flood of litigation. Still, an 
34 It should be noted, however, that Priest & Klein, supra note 4, at 7, suggest that their 
theory probably would not apply to comparative-negligence cases. Given this, the data in 
Daniels & Martin, supra note 30, may not be inconsistent with the Baxter-Priest-Klein 
prediction. 
35 Of course, it is possible that a defendant who loses an employment-discrimination suit 
may be sued by others or may incur costs in addition to damages and legal expenses. For 
example, an employer who cannot use a certain standardized test because it violates the 
disparate-impact doctrine may experience a large increase in hiring costs. The probability 
of suits by similar victims or of an injunction that will increase operating costs, however, 
is small in the typical employment-discrimination suit-a discriminatory-discharge claim. 
See John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimi- 
nation Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983 (1991). It follows that the reputational consequences 
of the loss of a typical employment-discrimination lawsuit are likely to be insignificant. 
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adverse judgment is a negative statement about the quality of the defen- 
dant's product, and this suggests that the defendant will have more at 
stake than the plaintiff. 
The third problem (noted by Priest and Klein) is that the differential- 
stakes theory does not explain the high win rate in worker-injury suits 
against nonemployers (Table A3).36 The informational-asymmetry model 
suggests a possible reason. These injuries are likely to be influenced by 
the care of both parties, and, since the injurer cannot observe the plain- 
tiff's level of care, it is possible that the plaintiff has the informational 
advantage. 
One might argue that the fact that awards are generally higher in mal- 
practice and product-liability suits, even though win rates are lower con- 
tradicts the informational-advantage theory. Thus, it may seem unlikely 
that the low win rates in these areas reflect a tendency of "guilty" defen- 
dants to settle at higher rates than "innocent" defendants. Higher awards 
in malpractice and product-liability cases, however, are not inconsistent 
with the model. First, the awards are likely to be against defendants who 
have violated the relevant legal standard. Second, given the high cost of 
litigating in these areas, it is not surprising that average awards are also 
high. Only plaintiffs who can claim substantial awards will have an incen- 
tive to bring suit. 
An alternative explanation for the win-rate pattern in tort cases is that 
weaker cases are being brought in anticipation of larger awards.37 There 
are several reasons to doubt this. The first, noted by Eisenberg, is that 
win rates are low in other areas, such as civil rights, without correspond- 
ingly high damage awards.38 A second reason is that the incentive to bring 
suit does not depend only on the damage award but also on the economic 
return from bringing suit, which requires subtracting the cost of bringing 
suit from the damage award (and correcting for risk, too). Unless the 
economic return from bringing suit is greater in product-liability and mal- 
practice cases-and this has not been shown-there is no reason to be- 
lieve that plaintiffs have incentives to bring weaker claims in anticipation 
of higher awards in the product-liability and malpractice areas. 
Although the Priest-Klein prediction of a 50 percent win rate may hold 
generally in aggregated data, it does not appear to hold when the data 
are disaggregated across areas of litigation.39 The theory presented here 
36 The typical defendants in the sample are nonemployer construction companies, build- 
ing owners, or architects; Priest & Klein, supra note 4, at 43. 
37 See Wittman, Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 313, 337. 
38 Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 1580. 
39 See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: New Data on Pretrial Bar- 
gaining, the Selection of Cases for Trial, and Jury Verdicts in Civil Cases (unpublished 
manuscript, Univ. Michigan Law School 1990). 
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may provide an explanation for this difference. As one aggregates win 
rates from several litigation fields, the influence of any type of informa- 
tional asymmetry characteristic of a given litigation field is diminished. 
Therefore, the aggregate win rate will approximate 50 percent as pre- 
dicted by the Priest-Klein model, which assumes no informational advan- 
tages. 
An additional though somewhat weaker prediction of my model is that, 
when defendants have the informational advantage, win rates should fall 
over time. Few empirical studies have examined the behavior of win 
rates over time; however, the three studies of which I am aware-one 
examining antitrust,40 another federal employment discrimination cases,41 
and the third product-liability litigation42-reveal that win rates have been 
falling in these areas after an initial period of doctrinal development. The 
Steven Salop and Lawrence White study of private antitrust litigation 
reveals that the average win rate of plaintiffs fell from 17 percent before 
1974 to 48 percent in the 1980s.43 Peter Siegelman's examination of federal 
employment-discrimination litigation demonstrates that the win rate has 
fallen from 1977 to 1988.44 James Henderson and Theodore Eisenberg's 
study of federal court product-liability cases reveals that, after expan- 
sions in product liability over the 1960s and 1970s,45 the win rate has 
fallen over the 1980s.46 If the low win rates observed in antitrust, employ- 
ment-discrimination, and product-liability cases are due to the selection 
effect, as described in this article, then the fact that these win rates have 
been falling provides additional support for the theory. 
IV. SOME ADDITIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
In addition to explaining win-rate patterns, the theory presented in this 
article has implications on the divergence between observed win rates 
and perceptions of the likelihood of plaintiff success and on theories of 
doctrinal change. 
If the selection effect operates as described here, one should expect to 
find plaintiffs' attorneys more optimistic than seems warranted by objec- 
tive measures of win rates in areas such as malpractice and product liabil- 
ity where defendants have the informational advantage. Similarly, in any 
40 Salop & White, supra note 10. 
41 Siegelman, supra note 10. 
42 Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 10. 
43 Salop & White, supra note 10, at 40. 
44 Siegelman, supra note 10, at 8, 15. 
45 See, for example, W. Page Keeton, Dan B. Dobbs, Robert E. Keeton, & David G. 
Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 692-702 (1984). 
46 Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 10, at 506, 508, 525. 
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area where plaintiffs have the informational advantage, one should expect 
to find overly pessimistic assessments of the plaintiff's likelihood of win- 
ning a suit. This hypothesis could be tested by comparing the average 
attorneys' subjective estimate of the probability of winning, say, a mal- 
practice suit to the objective measures of win rates in malpractice cases. 
I am aware of no empirical study that compares attorneys' subjective 
estimates of the likelihood of winning to objective measures of win rates. 
Press reports and the liability literature, however, generally have re- 
flected frequently voiced concerns over doctrinal expansion and in- 
creased litigation in malpractice and product liability even though these 
win rates have remained well below 50 percent.47 This may be due to a 
general perception on the part of attorneys that the probability of success 
is relatively high in these areas in spite of low win rates, which may 
largely reflect settlement patterns. Indeed, Peter Huber has claimed that 
the "likelihood of success rose from 20 to 30 percent in a product case 
in the 1960s to more than 50 percent in the 1980s."48 Since Huber could 
not have gotten his "more than 50 percent" figure from observations of 
win rates, he must have arrived at it through talking to attorneys. Huber's 
estimate may be a reasonably accurate description of the average prod- 
uct-liability attorney's subjective estimate of the probability of success. 
A second implication of this article concerns legal-research methodol- 
ogy. Both my model and the Priest-Klein selection theory imply a poten- 
tial bias in concluding from court opinions that the law in a given area is 
shifting to either a proplaintiff or a prodefendant stance. The selection 
process implies that the deterrent effect of a legal regime, specifically its 
ability to make actors comply with legal rules, cannot easily be inferred 
from trends in court decisions or plaintiff win rates. In my model, for 
example, innocent defendants will be most heavily oversampled among 
litigated disputes when potential injurers are generally complying with 
the law.49 Such oversampling could lead to a stream of court opinions 
that seem either neutral or prodefendant and, at the least, will influence 
the set of issues that reach appellate courts. A legal researcher who infers 
that the legal regime is shifting in favor of defendants could easily be 
wrong. The generally accepted approach of inferring a change in the legal 
47 See, for example, Robert E. Litan, Peter Swire, & Clifford Winston, The U.S. Liability 
System: Background and Trends in Liability: Perspectives and Policy 8 (Robert E. Litan 
& Clifford Winston eds. 1988). 
48 Peter Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 10 (1988). "More 
than 50 percent" is a vast overstatement of the plaintiff win rate in product-liability liti- 
gation. 
49 If W is small (less than 1/2), then the proportion of defendants who reject settlement 
demands and are innocent, SiW/[SiW + (1 - W)], will be greater than the proportion of 
rejecters who are guilty, (1 - W)I[SiW + (1 - W)], and innocent defendants will be 
oversampled in the set of litigated disputes. 
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regime from a perceived change in legal doctrine ignores the possibility 
that the doctrinal shift may reflect, for the most part, a change in the type 
of case that is being litigated. 
This criticism applies to all theories that treat doctrinal change as the 
result of conscious efforts on the part of judges. Consider, for example, 
the claim that the modifications in nineteenth-century tort doctrine- 
revealed by the larger number of opinions discussing the level of care 
exercised by the defendant-reflected an effort on the part of judges to 
subsidize industry.50 This ignores the possibility that, over the relevant 
period, the typical defendant standing before the judge may have changed 
from one whose lack of care was obvious to one who had taken substan- 
tial precautions. The criticism also applies to the claim that judgments in 
favor of defendants in product-liability cases reflect an attempt by judges 
to reverse the trend of expanding liability for manufacturers.51 
Judicial-effort theories treat legal doctrine as being shaped through the 
collective efforts of judges. They typically fail to provide a reason why 
judges would decide to work together to change a particular doctrine. In 
contrast, selection models suggest that doctrinal change is the result of 
an evolutionary process. Just as the characteristics that are most likely 
to be observed within a species in the next generation are associated with 
the genes likely to be passed on to that generation, the disputes that are 
most likely to influence legal doctrine tomorrow are those in which the 
divergence in the litigants' expectations-the settlement gap-is great- 
est. Under the Priest-Klein model, since neither party has an informa- 
tional advantage, the disputes in which the settlement gap is greatest will 
contain roughly equal subpopulations of innocent and guilty defendants. 
In the model presented here, in torts where only the defendant's care 
matters, disputes in which the settlement gap is greatest will contain a 
disproportionate share of innocent defendants. This imbalance should 
influence the menu of issues reaching appellate courts. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This article offers a new theory of the distinction between settled and 
litigated cases. The standard theory predicts a 50 percent win rate for 
plaintiffs. My theory predicts that the plaintiff win rate will be less than 
50 percent in areas where defendants have the informational advantage 
in litigation and greater than 50 percent if the converse holds. A 50 per- 
cent win rate will be observed in areas where neither party has the infor- 
mational advantage in litigation. 
50 M. Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law 1780-1860, at 85-99 (1977). 
51 Henderson & Eisenberg, supra note 10. 
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TABLE Al 
PLAINTIFF SUCCESS RATES AT TRIAL BY CASE CATEGORY, 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 1978-85 
Administrative 
Office Code 
Contract: 
Insurance 
Marine 
Miller Act 
Negotiable instruments 
Recovery of overpayments and enforcement of 
judgments 
Recovery of defaulted student loans 
Recovery of overpayments of veteran benefits 
Other contract actions 
Contract product liability 
Torts: personal injury: 
Airplane 
Airplane product liability 
Assault, libel, and slander 
Federal employers' liability 
Marine 
Marine: product liability 
Motor vehicle 
Motor vehicle: product liability 
Other personal injury 
Personal injury: medical malpractice 
Personal injury: product liability 
Torts: personal property damage: 
Other fraud 
Truth in lending 
Other personal property damage 
Property damage-product liability 
Civil rights: 
Other civil rights 
Voting 
Jobs 
Accommodations 
Welfare 
Property rights: 
Copyright 
Patent 
Trademark 
Other statutes: 
Antitrust 
SOURCE.-Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with 
Empirical Tests, 19 J. Legal Stud. 337, 357, table Al (1970). 
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110 
120 
130 
140 
150 
152 
153 
190 
195 
310 
315 
320 
330 
340 
345 
350 
355 
360 
362 
365 
370 
371 
380 
365 
440 
441 
442 
443 
444 
820 
830 
840 
410 
Success 
N Rate 
2,494 .52 
1,089 .69 
285 .79 
560 .78 
128 .77 
19 .84 
51 .80 
6,643 .64 
252 .57 
448 .55 
149 .40 
490 .42 
890 .72 
2,429 .59 
46 .37 
3,261 .60 
392 .33 
3,808 .46 
697 .38 
3,255 .25 
716 .60 
10 .60 
980 .59 
3,255 .25 
4,970 .33 
118 .53 
7,165 .21 
223 .43 
59 .47 
243 .71 
473 .48 
407 .67 
586 .43 
TABLE A2 
PLAINTIFF SUCCESS RATES IN SELECTED TYPES OF REPORTED TORT CASES (PLAINTIFF WINS $1.00 OR MORE) 
TYPE OF TORT CASE 
Vehicular Product Medical Street Premises 
Accidents Liability Malpractice Hazard Liability 
SITE (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Arizona Superior Court, 
1981-85: 
Maricopa 
California Superior Court, 
1981-84: 
Alameda 
Fresno 
Los Angeles 
Sacramento 
San Diego 
San Francisco 
Georgia Superior Court, 
1982-84: 
Cobb 
De Kalb 
Fulton 
Illinois Circuit Court, 
1981-85: 
Cook 
DuPage 
Kane 
Lake 
McHenry 
Will 
Winnebago 
66.1 
66.3 
64.1 
66.3 
62.6 
59.0 
66.2 
63.0 
46.3 
49.4 
628 44.1 
83 
39 
637 
91 
134 
154 
58 27.8 55 42.3 
45.8 24 33.3 24 60.0 
25.0 4 .0 6 33.3 
43.7 214 31.0 245 35.9 
9.5 21 26.1 23 100.0 
30.0 20 42.1 38 33.3 
44.0 25 48.3 29 40.0 
27 100.0 
95 .. 
164 29.4 
59.9 2504 
63.2 239 
65.4 78 
71.2 146 
63.0 27 
72.3 148 
63.3 60 
1 12.5 
0 29.4 
17 45.7 
8 
17 . 
35 100.0 
26 44.0 109 
5 46.7 30 
3 42.9 14 
65 49.6 270 
1 61.8 34 
10 45.3 53 
5 51.0 51 
0 25.0 
0 45.0 
1 52.1 
4 
20 
73 
34.8 134 33.8 134 67.7 197 52.3 309 
.0 7 17.9 28 57.1 7 45.5 33 
40.0 5 33.3 10 75.0 4 59.1 22 
.0 6 47.4 19 100.0 2 38.9 36 
50.0 2 25.0 8 .. 0 55.6 9 
25.0 4 18.2 22 57.1 7 54.5 33 
40.0 5 25.0 8 100.0 1 50.0 22 
TABLE A2 (Continued) 
TYPE OF TORT CASE 
Vehicular Product Medical Street Premises 
Accidents Liability Malpractice Hazard Liability 
SITE (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Kansas District Court, 
1981-85: 
Johnson 
Wyandotte 
Missouri Circuit Court, 
1981-85: 
Clay 
Jackson 
Platte 
New York Supreme, Civil, 
and County Courts, 
1981-84: 
Bronx 
Erie 
King 
Monroe 
58.8 
65.0 
114 37.5 
143 28.6 
48.6 35 
48.8 291 
53.3 15 
77.7 112 
64.6 48 
67.8 304 
70.4 27 
16 47.1 
7 50.0 
50.0 4 75.0 
56.0 25 26.3 
0 .0 
66.7 
25.0 
42.9 
66.7 
17 .0 
10 57.1 
4 
38 
1 
62.5 
. . . 
15 51.2 43 74.1 
8 15.4 13 100.0 
7 46.2 130 50.0 
3 .0 1 .0 
2 38.2 34 
7 41.2 17 
0 36.4 
8 52.4 
0 33.3 
11 
42 
3 
27 80.3 66 
5 48.1 27 
26 58.7 104 
1 46.2 13 
00 
Nassau 
New York 
Onondaga 
Queens 
Richmond 
Suffolk 
Westchester 
Oregon Circuit Court, 
1984-85: 
Multnomah 
Texas District and County 
Court: 
Bexar, 1982-84 
Dallas, 1981-85 
Harris, 1981-85 
Washington Superior Court, 
1983-85: 
: King 
\o Pierce 
Skagit 
Snohomish 
Spokane 
Yakima 
50.7 
79.0 
56.3 
57.6 
75.6 
60.1 
49.4 
215 
195 
16 
170 
45 
199 
87 
28.6 
60.7 
66.7 
50.0 
50.0 
42.9 
16.7 
61.7 115 50.0 
50.8 122 28.6 
47.5 301 30.8 
61.3 614 36.5 
75.4 
80.0 
90.0 
80.4 
80.3 
81.5 
183 
50 
10 
46 
66 
27 
58.8 
60.0 
. . . 
25.0 
60.0 
25.0 
14 33.3 90 23.1 
28 45.0 169 60.4 
3 20.0 5 100.0 
10 45.1 71 73.7 
2 22.2 9 .0 
14 46.2 26 66.7 
6 17.9 39 16.7 
16 50.0 18 22.2 
21 10.5 19 
40 20.5 44 
85 10.9 119 
17 25.0 
5 25.0 
0 . 
4 25.0 
5 60.0 
4 50.0 
32 
8 
0 
4 
5 
6 
13 31.3 80 
48 63.4 153 
1 64.3 14 
19 47.0 66 
4 37.5 8 
6 52.3 44 
6 30.0 30 
9 46.7 30 
.0 1 22.9 48 
.0 1 33.3 91 
47.4 18 44.8 171 
62.5 
33.3 
85.7 
.0 
. . . 
8 53.8 
3 65.6 
0 .0 
7 50.0 
1 56.3 
0 63.6 
39 
8 
3 
10 
16 
11 
SOURCE.-Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Jury Verdicts and the "Crisis" in Civil Justice, 11 Just. Sys. J. 321, Table A2 (1986). 
NOTE.-Column 1 = the percentage of successful verdicts; col. 2 = the total number of verdicts. 
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TABLE A3 
PROPORTION OF PLAINTIFF VICTORIES IN CONTESTED CIVIL CASES TRIED TO JURIES BY CASE 
TYPE, COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS, 1959-79 
PLAINTIFF VICTORIES 
Percent Total Cases CASE TYPE 
1. Traffic 47.4 9,987 
2. Common carrier 52.3 879 
3. Injury on property 47.8 1,396 
4. Street hazard 55.6 399 
5. Dramshop 53.8 371 
6. Worker injury 66.3 775 
7. Product liability 42.8 477 
8. Malpractice 39.6 202 
9. Assault, dignitary harm, business tort 53.9 1,013 
Total traffic 47.79 10,866 
Total nontraffic 52.50 4,633 
Total all cases 15,499 
SOURCE.-George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. Legal 
Stud. 1, table 7 (1984). 
